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7. Provincializing the clitoris
Jeanette Edwards and Michael Thomson1
The tale of the clitoris is a parable of culture, of how the body is forged into a shape valuable to civili-
zation despite, not because of, itself.
Thomas Laqueur, Making Sex: Body and Gender from the Greeks to Freud (Harvard University Press, 
1992), 236
To ‘provincialize’ Europe was precisely to find out how and in what sense European ideas that were 
universal were also, at one and the same time, drawn from very particular intellectual and historical 
traditions that could not claim any universal validity.
Dipesh Chakrabarty, Provincializing Europe: postcolonial thought and historical difference (2nd 
edition, Oxford; Princeton University Press, 2009), xiii
1. INTRODUCTION 
In 2015, The Nuffield Council on Bioethics (NCoB) convened an interdisciplinary working 
party to investigate ethical issues emerging in the increasing use of cosmetic procedures in 
the UK. The final report, published on 22 June 2017, made a number of recommendations to 
various organizations, institutions, policy-makers and regulatory bodies.2 One of the things 
that distinguished it from many previous NCoB enquiries was an insistence on shifting the dis-
cussion of ethics beyond the patient-practitioner encounter and locating the demand and pro-
vision of cosmetic procedures in the wider social, cultural and economic milieu. Both authors 
were members of the working party and we take the opportunity here to reflect on what we 
learnt in the interdisciplinary, collaborative and consultative process and to draw out a theme 
of mutual interest that emerged from our work with the Council but that fell outside its remit. 
We take this opportunity to put social anthropology and socio-legal studies into conversation 
and to discern fruitful directions for studying some of the intersections between law, medicine 
and society, the focus for a significant and growing subfield of study.
In the process of investigating cosmetic procedures, the working party was acutely aware 
not only of the challenges of definition—of what to include and exclude under the umbrella 
term ‘cosmetic procedures’—but also of the difficulty in drawing sharp and consistent distinc-
tions between them and many other non-medically orientated, but nonetheless physically inva-
1 We would like to thank Josh Warburton for his research assistance, and colleagues in the 
Department of Social Anthropology at Manchester and the editors of the handbook for their helpful 
thoughts and comments on earlier drafts of this chapter. We would also like to acknowledge here the 
work of Nuffield Council staff, the Working Party and especially Katharine Wright and Kate Harvey 
who were instrumental in the research and final report on which this paper draws. We write here inde-
pendently and not as members of the Nuffield Council, and our views should not be taken as representing 
those of the Council or the Working Party.
2 ‘Cosmetic procedures: Ethical Issues’ (Nuffield Council on Bioethics, June 2017) <http:// 
nuffieldbioethics .org/ project/ cosmetic -procedures> accessed 1 April 2018.
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sive, beauty practices or with therapeutic and reconstructive surgeries that include aesthetic 
considerations. For example, the working party excluded tattoos, scarifications and piercings 
from its remit, as well as reconstructive surgery after mastectomy or dermal abrasions to treat 
skin disorders.3
We also excluded from our remit both male circumcision and what today is commonly 
referred to as FGM (female genital mutilation),4 even though they share some of the character-
istics of the cosmetic procedures we were considering.5 While the final report did make refer-
ence to FGM and the Female Genital Mutilation Act 2003, it did so for comparative purposes 
only and to underline the point that some of the procedures that come under the umbrella of 
female genital cosmetic surgery (FGCS) are ‘anatomically identical’ to the procedures explic-
itly prohibited by the Act.6
It is our own boundary drawing in the working party and the wider and contradictory 
responses to FGCS and FGM that have inspired both the subject of this chapter and the con-
versation we intend between social anthropology and socio-legal studies. We take this oppor-
tunity not only to unbracket FGM but also to broaden and nuance discussions of FGCS. We do 
so by shifting our focus from practices, and their moral evaluation, to one of the key entities 
(either explicit or implicit) in the comparison—the clitoris.7 In so doing, we have inevitably 
drawn other boundaries: notably, and for present purposes, between consenting adult women 
and children, bracketing out, for example, significant issues attached to minors and consent.
3 While recognizing the arbitrary nature of its classification, it proceeded with a working definition 
of cosmetic procedures as ‘an umbrella term to cover invasive, non-reconstructive procedures that: aim 
to change a person’s appearance primarily for aesthetic, rather than functional, reasons; are carried out 
by third parties in a medical environment, or in an environment that “feels” medical (such as a medi-spa); 
and are not ordinarily publicly funded through public health systems such as the NHS. Such procedures 
include cosmetic surgery and dentistry, as well as nonsurgical interventions’ (A guide to the report, p. 3).
4 The term ‘FGM’ is heavily contested. For many members of practicing communities, as well as 
many commentators, the word mutilation is prejudicial and derogatory, stigmatizing those who undergo 
the diverse and various interventions it covers, and begging the question of why some forms of genital 
cutting are considered to be mutilating and other aesthetically pleasing. See for example B. Shell-Duncan 
and Y. Hernlund (eds), Female ‘Circumcision’ in Africa: Culture, Controversy, and Change (Lynne 
Rienner Publishers 2000); D.S. Davis, ‘Male and Female Genital Alteration: A Collision Course with 
the Law?’ (2001) 11 Health Matrix 487; L.A. Obiora, ‘Bridges and Barricades: Rethinking Polemics and 
Intransigence in the Campaign Against Female Circumcision’ (1997) 47 Case W Res L Rev 275. We will 
continue to use the acronym FGM as it is used in UK legal, medical and feminist discourses, and will 
use the term female genital cutting (FGC) where analytically appropriate, and female circumcision (FC) 
where ethnographically relevant.
5 There was an agreement that addressing male circumcision and ‘FGM’ would require specific 
detailed attention beyond the terms of reference set for the Working Party.
6 ‘Cosmetic procedures: Ethical Issues’ (Nuffield Council on Bioethics, June 2017). <http:// 
nuffieldbioethics .org/ project/ cosmetic -procedures> accessed 1 April 2018, 76–77.
7 We acknowledge that there are significant ethical problems attached to carving out just one part of 
the female body for scrutiny.
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2. MAPPING THE CLITORIS
According to Lisa Moore and Adele Clarke, scholarly attention to the clitoris has been 
‘dwarfed by phallocentric narratives, images and fascinations’.8 Indeed, given laws enacted 
against FGM in the UK, and the wider attention the practices have generated, the clitoris 
appears surprisingly infrequently in legal debate.9 Yet the clitoris was a key entity in feminist 
theorizing about female sexuality in the 1970s, and this strongly influenced both the legal 
debate about FGM in the UK, and the many international campaigns concerned with its erad-
ication.10 In focusing on the clitoris, we draw heavily on feminist accounts, but look to locate 
it in its historical and cultural specificity and thus to ‘provincialize’ it (a concept to which we 
return below). To do so, we track it across different, but interlinked, domains of knowledge: 
starting with medicine, law and feminism. These are domains in which the clitoris accrues 
specific meanings and where it is mobilized to underline distinctive truth claims. We add 
a fourth domain—ethnography—and draw on ethnographic examples to situate the clitoris in 
contexts that are usually absent from the production of medical and legal knowledge in the 
UK. In the final section we return to the beauty industry and FGCS with which we began. We 
draw on these four domains to address responses to FGCS which, we argue, have been shaped 
by these earlier narratives.
In tracking the clitoris across these fields, ending with our analysis of the clitoris in FGCS, 
our aim is to unsettle the medico-legal alliance where law and biomedicine each accept, often 
unexamined, the truth claims of the other. With reference to scientific claims, Stacey Pigg 
argues that they 
stick when they are taken up by others—not just fellow scientists who judge the findings to be sound 
but people for whom the insight solves a problem, bolsters a case, or furthers an aim. The finding 
becomes indispensable to the extent that it is melded with a wide range of interests and actions.11
Scientific, medical and legal claims have privileged purchase, and this is bolstered when their 
‘objective’ accounts are counter-posed with ‘subjective’ cultural beliefs. It is unsurprising 
then that a distinction between biology and belief runs through the various accounts of the 
clitoris we present below. Writing of sexual and reproductive health campaigns in Nepal, Pigg 
shows how ‘culture’ and expert knowledge are consistently and unhelpfully pitched against 
one another, with ‘culture’ perceived as getting in the way of the solutions that experts pro-
pose.12 Pitching culture against biology, or belief against expert knowledge, is instrumental in 
determining which facts get to stick. For Pigg, this is a colonial politics of knowledge, not only 
8 L.J. Moore, A.E. Clarke, ‘Clitoral Conventions and Transgressions: Graphic Representations in 
Anatomy Texts, c1900–1991’ (1995) 21(2) Feminist Studies 255, 261.
9 We note 27 references in Hansard in 200 years, some of which we go on to discuss below.
10 Such as End FGM European Network (Endfgm.com, 2018) <http:// www .endfgm .eu/ > and 
Actionaid. ‘Female Genital mutilation’ (actionaid.org, 2018) <https:// www .actionaid .org .uk/ about -us/ 
what -we -do/ violence -against -women -and -girls/ female -genital -mutilation -what -is -fgm> both accessed 4 
April 2018.
11 S.L. Pigg, ‘Globalizing the facts of life’ in S.L. Pigg and V. Adams (eds), Sex in Development: 
Science, Sexuality and Morality in Global Perspective (Duke University Press 2005) 59.
12 ibid, Pigg adds that a ‘biologized notion of sex makes other ways of knowing and having a sexual 
body merely local, only cultural’ 58 (emphasis added).
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between the west and ‘the rest’, but also across divisions of class. As we note below, the same 
binaries play out starkly in debates about female genital cutting (FGC).
By putting different accounts of FGC side by side, our aim is to render the facts about the 
clitoris less sticky and more contingent. In so doing, we also illustrate how anthropology can 
help unsettle the tendency in some sections of health law and bioethics to accept biomedical 
claims as settled facts for legal and regulatory focus, rather than contingent, often contested 
and open to scrutiny.13 First, a note on how the concepts of provincializing and de-provincial-
izing are useful for interrogating the implicit pact between medicine and law where each 
privileges the others ‘facts’ as authoritative.
3. PROVINCIALIZING THE BODY 
Dipesh Chakrabarty’s influential project of provincializing Europe rests on an excavation of 
the languages and ‘the circumstances of their formulation’ that fed what were assumed to be 
universal ideas coming from European thinkers in the years between the Renaissance and the 
Enlightenment.14 For Chakrabarty, this task does not entail a simplistic out-of-hand rejection 
of Enlightenment rationalism as merely culturally specific, but rather an effort to unearth how 
its reason ‘has been made to look obvious far beyond the ground where it originated’.15 The 
problem, he argues, is the deeply entrenched historicism in European thinking that posits a uni-
versal history which places the European at the pinnacle and the non-European in the ‘waiting 
room’: waiting, that is, to catch up.16 For Vassos Argryou, the critique of historicism at the 
heart of Chakrabarty’s call to provincialize Europe is insufficient to dislodge the hegemony 
of European experience and thought: ‘doing away with historicism does not automatically 
guarantee cultural symmetry and balance between native and western lives’.17 He points to 
how the backwardness and inferiority of the Other is inscribed, by the dominant, onto the body 
of the dominated: for example, in idioms of vulgarity, barbarity and impurity. In his words, 
‘the dominated are associated not with the things of the past but with the things of the body, 
and the dominant not with the things of the present but with the things of the mind’.18 While 
it is unhelpful to imagine that it has to be either/or (that is, ways of thinking about the past or 
ways or thinking about the body), Arygrou nonetheless draws attention to how fundamental 
western ideas about the human and fleshy body are mobilized in the stratifying practices of 
the dominant.
13 M. Meloni makes a related but larger claim regarding the incorporation of the biological into 
sociological—and we would add socio-legal—inquiry, suggesting there is a tendency ‘to buy prima facie 
biological themes and tropes (from genetics, neuroscience or epigenetics) without much questioning 
of their plausibility within the life sciences themselves’. M. Meloni, S. Williams and P. Martin, ‘The 
biosocial: sociological themes and issues’ (2016) 64(1) The Sociological Review Monographs 7, 18.
14 D. Chakrabarty, Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference (2nd 
edn, Princeton University Press 2009).
15 ibid, 43.
16  ibid, xiv. To be precise, Chakrabarty defines historicism, as he is using it, as a ‘mode of thinking 
about history in which … any object under investigation retained a unity of conception throughout its 
existence and attained full expression through a process of development in secular, historical time’.
17 V. Arygrou, ‘Provincialising Europe: Reflections on questions of method and strategy’ (2001) 9(2) 
Social Anthropology 217, 220.
18 ibid, 220.
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The call to provincialize Europe is to make room for other ways of knowing and of being. 
However, to provincialize Europe entails paying attention not only to how Europeans imagine 
their place in time, but also to their organizing categories and to ask how those categories 
manage to become self-evident. It is the case that certain understandings of the human body 
and its parts have more traction than others, and in this chapter, we take up the case of the clit-
oris. Provincializing what are, at first glance, universal and powerful truths about the clitoris, is 
not to reject them out-of-hand, but rather to investigate how they travel, why they congeal and 
what they occlude. It is not merely to state that all truth claims are culturally and historically 
specific, but to look at how some, such as biological truths, are pitched against others, such as 
cultural beliefs, and the consequences of this. This, we argue, is important for those engaging 
in legal and ethical studies of the body and health.
4. PROVINCIALIZING GENITAL CUTTING
Discussion of practices of FGC for aesthetic, symbolic or medical reasons is fraught. Some 
practices are categorized and debated under the rubric of FGM, others as FGCS, and yet 
others as biomedical operations necessary to alleviate physical or psychological suffering. 
Furthermore, how practices are recorded does not necessarily reflect the motivation and 
meaning for either individuals or communities of practice. Nevertheless, while all are con-
tested and provoke debate, it is fair to say that those included under the category ‘FGM’ 
appear to be, by far, the most perplexing. On the one hand, they have generated opprobrium 
and forceful campaigns, both national and international, urging their eradication. On the other, 
they have become a flashpoint for a burgeoning critique of the continued dominance and 
imposition of ‘western’ or Eurocentric standards and world views, raising questions about who 
gets to articulate and impose what is socially, ethically and aesthetically desirable. Debate on 
FGM points to both the limits of cultural relativism,19 and the potential of universal women’s 
rights.20
The regulation of practices such as genital cutting that seek to modify the body has been 
charged with inconsistency and incoherence.21 Within a confused regulatory landscape, the 
fact that law and professional guidance takes radically different positions on male, female and 
intersex genital cutting has been the focus of sustained academic criticism.22 In a recent article, 
one of us has explored continuities across genital cutting practices affecting male and female 
children. This involved provincializing different forms of FGC, recognizing that practice, 
19 M. Nussbaum, Sex and Social Justice (Oxford University Press 1999).
20 M. Githae Mugo, ‘Elitist Anti-Circumcision Discourse as Mutilating and Anti-Feminist’ (1997) 47 
Case W. Res. L. Rev. 461; L.A. Obiora, supra n 4.
21 T. Bennett, Cuts and Criminality: Body Alteration in Legal Discourse (Ashgate Publishing 2015).
22 See for example D.S. Davies, ‘Male and female genital alteration: A collision course with the law’ 
(2001) 11 Health Matrix: Journal of Law-Medicine 487; B. Earp, ‘Female genital mutilation and male 
circumcision: Toward an autonomy-based ethical framework’ (2015) 5(1) Medicolegal and Bioethics 89; 
M. Fox and M. Thomson, ‘Foreskin is a feminist issue’ (2009) 24 Australian Feminist Studies 195; M. 
Johnson, ‘Male genital mutilation: Beyond the tolerable?’ (2010) 10(2) Ethnicities 181, 202; M. Fox and 
M. Thomson, ‘Bodily integrity, embodiment, and the regulation of parental choice’ (2017) 44(4) Journal 
of Law and Society 501; M. Fox, M. Thomson and J. Warburton, ‘Non-therapeutic male genital cutting 
& harm: Law, policy and evidence from UK hospitals’ (2019) 33(4) Bioethics 467–74.
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meaning, and experience differ significantly across social and cultural contexts.23 The very 
different practices that are typically homogenized and flattened under the rubric of FGM were 
explored in order to locate male genital cutting on a spectrum of genital cutting practices. This 
challenges the prevalent tendency to approach male and female genital cutting as categorically 
different.
As well as a focus on the discrepancy between male and female genital cutting, a growing 
body of literature is teasing out the relationship between FGCS and FGM. In the UK, FGM has 
been explicitly criminalized since the Prohibition of Female Circumcision Act 1985 and the 
Female Genital Mutilation Act 2003.24 Given the absolute nature of the UK’s legislation which 
prohibits all cutting at any age, as well as extra-territorially, questions have been raised about 
the position of FGCS vis-à-vis the criminal law provisions. Brenda Kelly and Charles Foster, 
for example, note that many FGCS procedures are, ‘as a matter of anatomical fact’, covered 
by the UK legislation,25 whilst Lisa Avalos asserts that ‘the FGM Act on its face prohibits … 
any form of FGCS that involves the cutting away of tissue’.26 Thus, academic commentary 
has addressed a seeming double standard whereby a white adult woman seeking FGCS is 
generally believed to be free to alter her genitals, whilst an adult woman of colour seeking 
genital cutting, which may be similar anatomically, is likely to face a different response.27 
This concern has also been raised by professional and governmental bodies, such as the UK 
Parliamentary Home Affairs Select Committee, and was noted in the NCoB report.28
Practices that come under the rubric of FGM make explicit what are deemed incommensu-
rable gaps between the ideals of ‘modern’ society, coded as liberal, enlightened and rational, 
and ‘traditional’ society, concomitantly illiberal, irrational and cruel. This incommensurable 
gap is enshrined in the UK legislation prohibiting FGM. In the explanatory notes accompa-
nying the Female Genital Mutilation Bill introduced to the House of Commons in December 
2002, it is written that FGM involves ‘procedures which include the partial or total removal of 
the external female genital organs for cultural or other non-therapeutic reasons.’29 A ‘saving’ 
is provided if a procedure is carried out by a registered medical practitioner and is necessary 
for physical or mental health:
23 B. Earp, J. Hendry and M. Thomson, ‘Reason and Paradox in Medical and Family Law: Shaping 
Children’s Bodies’ (2017) 25(4) Medical Law Review 604.
24 FGM has long been constructed as an international human rights issue and the procedures have 
been widely criminalized. See for example M. Fox and M. Thomson, ‘Bodily integrity, embodiment, and 
the regulation of parental choice’ (2017) 44(4) Journal of Law and Society 501.
25 B. Kelly and C. Foster, ‘Should female genital cosmetic surgery and genital piercing be regarded 
as ethically and legally as female genital mutilation’ (2012) 119(4) BJOG 389, 391.
26 L. Avelos, ‘Female Genital Mutilation and Designer Vaginas in Britain: Crafting an Effective 
Legal and Policy Framework’ (2014) 48 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 621, 637.
27 B. Kelly and C. Foster, supra n 25; L. Avelos, supra n 26. S. Sheldon and S. Wilkinson, ‘Female 
Genital Mutilation and Cosmetic Surgery: Regulating non-therapeutic body modification’ (1998) 12(4) 
Bioethics 263; N. Sullivan, ‘“The price we pay for our common good?”: Genital Modification and the 
Somatechnologies of Cultural (In)Difference’, (2007) 17(3) Social Semiotics 395. And see contrib-
utors to Y. Hernlund and B. Shell-Duncan, Transcultural Bodies: Female Genital Cutting in Global 
Context (Rutgers University 2007); B. Essén and S. Johnsdotter, ‘Female genital mutilation in the West: 
traditional circumcision versus genital cosmetic surgery’ (2004) 83 Acta Obstetrica et Gynaecology 
Scandinavica 611.
28 ‘Cosmetic procedures: Ethical Issues’ (Nuffield Council on Bioethics, June 2017) <http:// 
nuffieldbioethics .org/ project/ cosmetic -procedures> accessed 1 April 2018, 4.49–4.50.
29 Explanatory Notes to the Female Genital Mutilation Act 2003, para 3.
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Operations necessary for mental health could include, for example, cosmetic surgery resulting from 
the distress caused by a perception of abnormality or gender reassignment surgery. However, sub-
section (5) provides that in assessing a girl’s mental health no account is taken of any belief that the 
operation is needed as a matter of custom or ritual. So an FGM operation could not legally occur on 
the ground that a girl’s mental health would suffer if she did not conform with the prevailing custom 
of her community.30
Here culture and custom are pitched against medical expertise and judgement, and distress 
is hierarchized. In this formulation, suffering stemming from a ‘perception of abnormality’ 
is acknowledged as legitimate and a legitimate reason for medical intervention, but only if 
such abnormality is deemed either physical (anatomical) or psychological and diagnosed by 
a medical practitioner. Distress that might stem from not conforming with ‘prevailing custom’, 
which might also be rendered as a perception of being different (abnormal)—socially rather 
than psychologically or anatomically—is illegitimate. Such a formulation also rests on a dis-
tinction between the internal volition of the individual (good) as opposed to external coercion 
from the ‘community’ (bad). Distress, then, is not a good enough reason in itself to allow for 
the cutting of female genitals: it is the origin of the distress and the authority with which it is 
assessed that counts. We turn below to that authority, beginning with a discussion of what we 
gloss as the medical clitoris. But first a note on our taxonomy.
5. PROVINCIALIZING THE CLITORIS 
In what follows we identify how the clitoris is mobilized in interlocking domains of knowl-
edge, and point to how the facts in one gain their ‘facticity’ when they become useful in 
another.31 We have deliberately and artificially carved out specific domains that, in reality, 
bleed into one another, and we are aware that there are notable absences.32 However, the fields 
we have chosen reflect our work with the Nuffield Council, our own interest in collaboration 
between socio-legal studies and anthropology, and the themes of this volume—law, medicine 
and society. We focus on the clitoris as it appears in medicine, law, feminism and ethnogra-
phy.33 This is not to suggest that each domain is discrete, or that a different kind of clitoris is 
found in each. Our taxonomy of the medical clitoris, the legal clitoris, the liberated clitoris 
and the circumcised clitoris is a conceit: both contingent and incomplete. But it does, never-
theless, reflect specific preoccupations with the clitoris at various points in recent history. We 
start with the medical clitoris in part because it illustrates the mutability and multiplicity of 
understandings of the clitoris within even a single domain. Further, while we acknowledge the 
medical as a particularly privileged domain in terms of how bodies are understood and expe-
rienced, we also wish to highlight how meanings move between these domains and become 
(differently) refracted through them.34
30 ibid, para 6.
31 B. Latour, Science in Action: How to Follow Scientists and Engineers Through Society (new edn, 
Harvard University Press 1988).
32 We might have run our argument though other domains, for example, psychoanalysis, sexology or 
pornography.
33 Ethnography here refers to the accounts by anthropologists of the life worlds of those they study.
34 M. Lock and V.-K. Nguyen, An Anthropology of Biomedicine (John Wiley & Sons 2010) 7.
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5.1 The Medical Clitoris
Biomedicine rests on an understanding of human anatomy as universal and stable. As disci-
pline, anatomy draws on the assumption that the body is the same the world over: ‘knowable, 
real and essential’.35 In their account of how the clitoris appeared and disappeared in anatomy 
texts, published in English, over the twentieth century, Lisa Moore and Adele Clarke note 
that ‘Because anatomies construct, preserve, and portray some of the supposed essentials of 
essentialism, prevailing anatomies are highly consequential not only for biomedicine but also 
for many other disciplines and for people’s own understandings of their bodies’.36 By the 
mid-1970s, it was confidently stated that the anatomy of the clitoris had been ‘done’: as far 
as the discipline was concerned, ‘the structure of the organ [is] perhaps the least controversial 
aspect of the subject’.37 It seems, in retrospect, that this confidence was premature and more 
recent, feminist inspired, anatomical portrayals of the clitoris show a more complicated struc-
ture than hitherto imagined and it is not clear just how much more stable current depictions 
are. But let us stay for a moment with the twentieth century and take some examples from 
the range of anatomical texts that interested Moore and Clarke. Gray’s Anatomy, a standard 
textbook and published continuously in a series of editions throughout the twentieth century, 
labelled the clitoris (featured prominently) in its 1901 depiction of female reproductive organs, 
and left it out (completely) in its 1948 edition. From then on, until feminist inspired texts of 
the early 1970s, the clitoris was either absent or unlabeled in many of the cross-sectional 
images of female anatomy, at least in the texts surveyed by Moore and Clarke. As the authors 
note, this was at a time when other key publications were rejecting Freud’s vaginal orgasm 
as a myth and asserting the clitoris as the site of the female orgasm (for example, Kinsey in 
1953 and Masters and Johnson in 1966).38 From unlabeled worm-like bits, the new wave of 
anatomical texts designed by and for women drew clitorises in exquisite detail labeling not 
just its tip but now hood, glans, shaft and crura. However, according to Moore and Clarke, the 
impact of such re-workings on ‘dominant anatomy image makers’ was worse than minimal. It 
took the form of a backlash—a determined deletion: ‘visual clitoridectomy after a few decades 
of minimalist inclusion’.39 They conclude that anatomy’s clitoris has remained insulated from 
the challenges posed by feminist re-workings. We might see Moore and Clarke’s efforts as an 
attempt to provincialize a dominant, and relatively stable, understanding of the clitoris that is 
exported as a universal truth. This process is important as other disciplines, such as law, rely 
on such findings where they become foundational in their own knowledge practices. This may 
happen regardless of accuracy or the status or contingency of knowledge claims within the 
original discipline.
Up to now we have focused on anatomy as foundational knowledge for biomedical 
understandings and practices. But medical practice in the UK has had its own distinctive and 
infamous brush with the clitoris. Clitoridectomies (here actual rather than visual) have a long 
history and were prescribed to counteract both homosexuality and over-sexuality. In the UK 
35 Moore and Clarke, supra n 8, 257.
36 ibid, 258–9.
37 T. Power Lowry and T. Snyder Lowry, The Clitoris (WH Green 1976) 2.
38 A.C. Kinsey, Sexual Behavior in the Human Female (Indiana University Press 1953); W.H. 
Masters and V.E. Johnson, Human Sexual Inadequacy (Little, Brown 1966).
39 Moore and Clarke, supra n 35, 248.
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the popularity of the procedure reached its peak in the 1850s, when a so-called ‘clitoridectomy 
craze’40 hit Victorian Britain as response to the multiple ailments known, at that time, to be 
caused by masturbation.41 The infamous Isaac Baker Brown’s cure for epilepsy and hysteria 
in women comprised the ‘complete excision of the clitoris with scissors, packing the wound 
with lint, administering opium via the rectum and strictly observing the patient’.42 Brown was 
eventually expelled from the British Obstetrical Society, and soon after resigned his fellow-
ship from the Medical Society of London, more it seems for publicizing his theories about 
clitoridectomy and talking publicly and graphically about women’s genitals than for removing 
their clitorises. This did not prevent Brown from influencing physicians in the US who took 
up his procedures with seeming gusto, increasing the number of ailments it could cure.43 This 
history has significant parallels with the emergence of secular and medicalized male circumci-
sion in the US and UK at this time. Here the promise of addressing the scourge of masturbation 
with its impact on individual health and the health of the nation saw the procedure proposed, 
normalized, and, by the end of the century, become the most frequently performed surgical 
intervention.44 While the British medical establishment succeeded in getting rid of Brown, it 
did not discredit the practice of clitoridectomy nor discourage its use by others. As Elizabeth 
Sheehan remarks for the time, ‘The medical profession wanted it both ways: the clitoris was 
so unimportant to a normal woman as not to be missed if removed, yet lurking in its tissue was 
the greatest threat to female welfare ever known’.45
There is a significant body of literature on medical clitoridectomies which shows that it was 
used in Britain and North America to control the bodies and sexuality of girls and women.46 
While space precludes us from drawing any further from this literature—or indeed exploring 
other dimensions of the medical clitoris—we would nevertheless make three brief observa-
tions regarding medical practice lest this episode be thought of as a peculiarly Victorian phe-
nomena. First, medical clitoridectomies lasted well into the twentieth century on both sides of 
the Atlantic. The last clitoridectomy to ‘correct emotional disorders’ in the UK was performed 
40 A. Scull and D. Favereau, ‘Clitoridectomy Craze’, (1986) 53(2) Social Research 243.
41 The degree to which there was a ‘craze’ in the UK is contested by some, see R. Darby, A Surgical 
Temptation: The Demonization of the Foreskin and the Rise of Circumcision in Britain (Chicago 
University Press 2005) 143.  Nevertheless, it is accepted that the clitoridectomy was enthusiastically 
embraced by the American medical profession: S.B. Rodriguez, ‘Female Circumcision as Sexual 
Therapy: The Past and Future of Plastic Surgery’ (Pacific Standard, 24 February 2014) <https:// psmag 
.com/ social -justice/ female -circumcision -sexual -therapy -past -future -plastic -surgery -73229> accessed 1 
April 2018.
42 Cited in F.J. Green, ‘From clitoridectomies to “designer vaginas”: The medical construction of 
heteronormative female bodies and sexuality through female genital cutting’ (2005) 7(2) Sexualities, 
Evolution and Gender 153, 162. The best-known advocate of ‘female circumcision’ in the UK was 
the prominent doctor Isaac Baker Brown. See, I. Baker Brown, On the Curability of Certain Forms of 
Insanity, Epilepsy, Catalepsy and Hysteria in Females (Robert Hardwicke 1866).
43 ibid, Green.
44 R. Darby, A Surgical Temptation: The Demonization of the Foreskin and the Rise of Circumcision 
in Britain (Chicago University Press 2005); B. Earp, J. Hendry and M. Thomson, ‘Reason and Paradox 
in Medical and Family Law: Shaping Children’s Bodies’ (2017) 25(4) Medical Law Review 604.
45 E. Sheehan, ‘Victorian Clitoridectomy: Isaac Baker Brown and His Harmless Operative Procedure’ 
in R.N. Lancaster and M. Di Leonardo (eds), The Gender/Sexuality Reader (Routledge 1997) 328.
46 B. Baker-Benfield, ‘Sexual Surgery in Late-Nineteenth-Century America’ (1975) International 
Journal of Health Sciences 279–98; G.J. Baker-Benfield, The Horror of the Half-Known Life (Routledge 
2000).
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in the 1940s on a five year old girl,47 and clitoridectomies were available as a ‘medical’ proce-
dure on some health insurance plans in the US until the 1970s.48 Second, not having an orgasm 
in heterosexual penetrative sex was (and still is) pathologized in idioms of ‘frigidity’. Marie 
Bonaparte, a follower of Freud, advocated an operation that severed the ‘suspensory ligament’ 
and thus moved the clitoris nearer the vaginal opening to cure frigidity,49 and we shall return 
below to forms of FGCS that aim to facilitate and enhance female orgasm. Third, it might be 
argued that one contemporary manifestation of such surgical interventions can be found in the 
twentieth-century practice of cutting children’s clitorises (cliteroplasty) if deemed too big (that 
is, too much like a penis). Here guided by the ‘locker room test’,50 there is a compulsion to 
remove clitorises of more than three-eighths of an inch which, along with small penises which 
may also be removed, constitute ‘a psychosocial emergency’.51 In each of these instances, the 
biomedical clitoris appears as a site and means for marking the distinction between male and 
female bodies and for the management of female sexuality.
Moving now to the legal clitoris, we preface this by returning to where we started in our 
consideration of the medical clitoris and note that law is one of the disciplines and practices 
that regard anatomy not only as a stable science, but also as foundational truth from which the 
work of law can proceed. And, as we will demonstrate, the law also enthusiastically adopted 
the medical trope of the clitoris as the site of sexual excess.
5.2 The Legal Clitoris
Anna Funder’s, ‘De Minimus Non Curat Lex: The Clitoris, Culture and the Law’52 reflects the 
wider contours of legal discourse. Here, discussion of the clitoris is subsumed within a broader 
consideration of FGM, and in turn this becomes a discussion of cultural relativism. The article 
illustrates a number of the issues with legal scholarship we address in this chapter, not least the 
uncritical acceptance of medical knowledge claims as objective, ahistorical and asocial: ‘The 
clitoris, culture, and the law seem to belong to different epistemological terrains. The clitoris 
belongs in biological discourse, culture is best analyzed in the terms of social sciences, and 
international law is the domain of normative international relations theory’.53 As with much 
legal discourse, Funder treats FGM as a unitary practice occasioning a series of serious health 
impacts and risks including death, painful intercourse, obstructed childbirth, haemorrhaging, 
47 Sheehan, supra n 45, 333; after D. English and B. Ehrenreich, Witches, Midwives & Nurses, 
(Feminist Press 1973).
48 S.B. Rodriguez, Female Circumcision and Clitoridectomy in the United States (University of 
Rochester Press 2014).
49 Cited in A. Koedt, Myth of the Vaginal Orgasm (New England Free Press 1970).
50 As Chau and Herring explain, ‘The doctor would imagine the child when older showering with 
other children: would the child be accepted by the others as a boy or girl or would they be teased.’ P.-L. 
Chau and J Herring, ‘Defining, Assigning, and Designing Sex’ (2002) 16 International Journal of Law, 
Policy and the Family 327, 337.
51 N. Sullivan, ‘“The Price to Pay for our Common Good”: Genital Modification and the 
Somatechnologies of Cultural (In)Difference’ (2007) 17(3) Social Semiotics 395, 401. See, also, M. Fox 
and M. Thomson, ‘Sexing the cherry: fixing masculinity’ in N. Sullivan and S. Murray (eds), Queer(ing) 
Somatechnics: Critical Engagements with Bodily (Trans) Formations (Ashgate 2009) 107.
52 A. Funder, ‘De Minimus Non Curat Lex: The Clitoris, Culture and the Law’ (1993) 3 Transnational 
Law & Contemporary Problems 417.
53 ibid, 418.
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tetanus, septicaemia, infection, bleeding, pain, frigidity, insatiability, anxiety, melancholy and 
depression.54 Difference and the clitoris are erased, while frigidity and excess reappear. As in 
the explanatory notes to the 2003 legislation, the biological remains black-boxed, its premises 
known as fact. These contours are reflected elsewhere in legal discourse. In the House of Lords 
debate on the Prohibition of Female Circumcision Bill in April 1983, for example, Lord Rea 
clarified for others in the House that the clitoris was the ‘core or focus for a woman’s sexuality 
and ability to experience sexual pleasure’. He went on: ‘To deprive a woman of her clitoris 
is thus to deprive her of her major source of sexual pleasure and satisfaction. Sexual arousal 
can still take place, however, but without the relief given by a climax or orgasm this can lead 
to tension and unhappiness’.55 Baroness Gaitskill agreed, similarly promoting the clitoris as 
the site of female pleasure: ‘The clitoris is the organ which gives women pleasure.’56 The next 
month, debating the same Bill, Lord Hale refers to a criminal libel case known as the ‘Cult of 
the Clitoris’. This stormy trial, he tells the House, ‘had juries going mad and judges beyond 
control’.57 More egregious it seems than the libel itself, was the fact that both the judge and the 
Director of Public Prosecutions confessed to not having heard of the clitoris before the case. 
Understandably, perhaps, we were drawn to investigate the ‘Cult of the Clitoris’.
5.2.1 R v Pemberton-Billing [1919]
The extraordinary case of Pemberton-Billing began with an announcement in the Sunday 
Times in February 1918 of a performance of Oscar Wilde’s Salome. Salome was to be played 
by Maud Allen, a dancer who had become one of London’s most famous (and scandalous) 
dancers. Less than a week later, The Vigilante, a minor right-wing magazine published by 
the Member of Parliament Noel Pemberton-Billing, reported on the performance under the 
title, ‘The Cult of the Clitoris’. The magazine was the mouth piece for the Vigilante Society, 
an organization with a particular interest in combatting a secret German presence said to be 
responsible for spreading moral degeneracy in England and ‘British failures in the war’.58 
Pemberton-Billing’s short paragraph linked Allen to the claimed activities of German agents 
who had worked undercover for two decades to spread ‘debauchery of such lasciviousness as 
only German minds could conceive and only German bodies execute’; that is, ‘the propagation 
of evil which all decent men thought had perished in Sodom and Lesbia’.59 As Jodie Medd 
writes, ‘Homosexuality, it seems, was the enemy’s secret genocidal weapon’.60 In response, 
Allen accused Pemberton-Billing of criminal libel, implying that she was a lesbian and 
that her performance would promote perversion and espionage, specifically ‘lesbian sexual 
espionage’.61
54 ibid, 435–6.
55 HL Deb 21 April 1983, vol 441, col 680.
56 HL Deb 21 April 1983, vol 441, col 687.
57 HL Deb 10 May 1983 vol 442, col 442.
58 The Vigilante, Verbatim Report of the Trial of Noel Pemberton Billing M.P: On a charge of 
Criminal Libel, (Vigilante 1918).
59 ibid, 8.
60 J. Medd, ‘“The Cult of the Clitoris”: Anatomy of a National Scandal’ (2002) 9(1) Modernism/
modernity 21, 23.
61 ibid, 29.
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Medd argues that the phrase ‘conjoins the allusions and associations of immorality, national 
betrayal, homosexuality, and aestheticism’62 with the culturally unintelligible figure of the 
lesbian rendering it ‘most appealing for symbolic appropriation’.63 Here, however, it is the 
meaning of the clitoris within this very particular legal moment that is of interest. We have 
noted how the clitoris is associated in other domains with female sexual excess, or at the 
very least female non-reproductive desire and pleasure. Foregrounded within the euphe-
mistic treatment of same sex desire, it ‘simultaneously demands and refuses interpretation, 
inciting scandal through its very resistance to representation’.64 More prosaically, the case 
of Pemberton-Billing provided ‘a first in British legal history: a graphic explanation of the 
situation and function of the clitoris, and its method of arousal in lesbian sexual practices’.65
Whilst the case is not recorded, on his acquittal, Billing published a verbatim account of 
the six-day trial. This extended document provides some insight into understandings of the 
clitoris, and the role of biomedical and popular discourses as they travel across domains. 
For example, Mr Humphreys (giving evidence for the prosecution) provided an indication of 
popular (or perhaps ‘polite’) sentiment: ‘I find words which I must read, although I see there 
are some ladies in Court. I must read them aloud: “The cult of the clitoris”. (…) in my submis-
sion the words themselves are the filthiest words it would be possible to imagine’.66 Captain 
Harold Sherwood Spencer, a medical expert, provided further guidance for the court describ-
ing the clitoris as ‘a superficial organ that when unduly excited or over-developed possessed 
the most dreadful influence on any woman, that she would do most extraordinary things if she 
was over-developed in a superficial sense’.67 Going further, Captain Spencer suggested that an 
‘exaggerated clitoris might even drive a woman to an elephant’.68
It seems incredible, from a contemporary vantage point, that the clitoris could be imagined 
as such a powerful and dangerous organ. And perhaps our inclusion of this scandalous and 
extraordinary case might be viewed as merely voyeuristic. In our defense, however, the libel 
case and the claims it provoked amongst its protagonists mirror elements of the medical clit-
oris, and the excesses imagined by Baker Brown and others in over a century of biomedical 
discourse and practice. While Baker Brown was discredited, we would state again that clitori-
dectomies were taking place in both the UK and US well into the last century and indeed up to 
the 1970s. ‘The Cult of the Clitoris’, we argue, provides a further stark and vivid example of 
the way in which this same, relatively small, fleshy organ conveys powerful ideas and carries 
weight. As Thomas Laqueur writes of Freud’s dilemma that emerged in the decade preceding 
Pemberton-Billing: ‘On the one hand, the clitoris is the organ of sexual pleasure in women. On 
the other, its easy responsiveness to touch makes it difficult to domesticate for reproductive, 
heterosexual intercourse’.69 Freud’s solution was to demote the clitoris as the site of immature 
female sexuality and promote the vagina, and the vaginal orgasm, as the marker of mature, 





66 The Vigilante, supra n 58, 5.
67 The Vigilante, supra n 58, 163.
68 The Vigilante, supra n 58, 226.
69 T.W. Laqueur, ‘Amor Veneris, vel Dulcedon Appeletur’ in M. Feher, R. Naddaff and N. Tazi 
(eds), Fragments for a History of the Human Body, Pt. 3 (Zone Books 1989) 101.
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turity, eroticism, masturbation and same-sex desire—become the ‘filthiest words it would be 
possible to imagine’.70 In Laqueur’s words again, ‘Perhaps because Freud is the great theorist 
of sexual ambiguity he is also the inventor of a dramatic sexual antithesis: that between the 
embarrassing clitoris that girls abandon and the vagina whose erotogenic powers they embrace 
as the mark of the mature woman’.71 We turn next to a clitoris liberated from such Freudian 
constraints: that is, the clitoris reinstated and re-valued by feminism.
5.3 The Liberated Clitoris
The 1970s saw a number of robust responses to Sigmund Freud as the ‘founding father’ of 
the vaginal orgasm. Ann Koedt’s Myth of the Vaginal Orgasm in 197072 and The Hite Report 
in 1976,73 are landmark publications that nailed the myth of the vaginal orgasm to a misogy-
nist and androcentric mast. Later in the decade, Gloria Steinem and Robin Morgan accused 
Freud of performing ‘psychic clitoridectomies’ on millions of European and North American 
women.74 As Koedt explained, ‘Women have thus been defined sexually in terms of what 
pleases men; our own biology has not been properly analyzed. Instead, we are fed the myth 
of the liberated woman and her vaginal orgasm—an orgasm which in fact does not exist’.75 
Powerful attempts to assert the centrality of masturbation, lesbian sex and the clitoral orgasm 
to female sexuality meant that the clitoris became a potent symbol of women’s liberation.76 
As 1970s’ feminism underlined and celebrated the complexity of women’s sexuality and the 
diversity of self-pleasure, it privileged the clitoris. Alternative theories of dispersed sexuality 
were muted.77 There was recognition, for example, that ‘emotional orgasms’ exist, but as Shere 
Hite urged ‘their existence should never be used to discredit the fact that women have, enjoy, 
and need regular physical “clitoral” orgasms’.78 The clitoris became a figure of emancipation 
and also a rallying cry for separation. The London Women’s Liberation Workshop in 1974 
was dominated by the row provoked by the ‘CLIT statement’: a series of articles decrying 
heterosexuality, calling for total separation from men, and accusing heterosexual women of 
collaboration with the enemy.
70 The Vigilante, supra n 58, 5.
71 Laqueur, supra n 69, 101–2.
72 A. Koedt, Myth of the Vaginal Orgasm (New England Free Press 1970).
73 S. Hite, The Hite Report: A Nationwide Study of Female Sexuality, (2004 edn, Seven Stories Press 
2004).
74 Cited in C. Gosselin, ‘Feminism, Anthropology and the Politics of Excision in Mali: Global and 
Local Debates in a Postcolonial World’ (2000) 42(1) Anthropologica 43, 46.
75 Koedt, supra n 72, 38.
76 Note a pre-second wave feminist history to the erotic potential of the clitoris: prior, that is, to its 
‘discovery’ by the women’s liberation movement of the 1970s. Beatrix Campbell draws our attention to 
Helen Wright a medical doctor who, pre-empting the Kinsey report in the late 1940s, wrote about the 
penis-vagina fixation that was not conducive to the female orgasm.  She and many other doctors and 
counselors at that time were well aware of the erotic potential of the clitoris, but were sidelined by the 
prevailing sex literature and expertise. B. Campbell, ‘A feminist sexual politics: now you see it, now you 
don’t.’ (1980) 5 Feminist Review 1.
77 For a brief overview of the literature see M. Dopico, ‘Infibulation and the Orgasm Puzzle: Sexual 
Experiences of infibulated Eritrean Women in Rural Eritrea and Melbourne Australia’ in Hernlund and 
Shell-Duncan, supra n 27, 224–47.
78 Hite, supra n 73, 164 (emphasis added).
122 Research handbook on socio-legal studies of medicine and health
Feminist practice and politics in the 1970s also turned to self-examination. For Nancy Tuana 
it was an epistemic practice designed ‘to undermine ignorance’, and central to a politics that 
‘demanded embodied knowledge, which in turn illuminated the deep ignorance of standard 
accounts’.79 Self-examination, she reminds us, required the speculum:80 ‘In the hands of Carol 
Downer and other members of the women’s health movement, the speculum was transformed 
from a gynecological tool of control and suppression into an instrument of liberation’.81 The 
speculum here was a tool directed at self-knowledge and within this the epistemic value of 
variation.82 Thus, women were encouraged to examine themselves and others in groups, to 
become aware and be empowered. This came through both self-knowledge and an apprecia-
tion of variation that liberated the vulva from a pathologizing medical gaze which had hitherto 
defined (ab-)normality. Variation became ‘unexceptional’ difference that ‘non-professionals 
could recognize, monitor and manage’.83 While self-examination was clearly directed at 
self-knowledge and the appreciation of diversity for all parts of the vagina/vulva, the clitoris 
was obviously part of this and cannot be divorced from the feminist rewriting of clitoral 
anatomy discussed in the medical clitoris.
Of course feminists, whose political sensibilities were fashioned by consciousness raising 
efforts in the 1970s, would condemn, in no uncertain terms, any compulsion to intentionally 
excise the site not only of female sexuality and pleasure but also of emancipation. The idea 
that women in other parts of the world could not only cut the clitoris of their girls but also 
explain why it should be cut was unsurprisingly anathema to most. From many feminist and 
campaigning perspectives, the removal of part or all of the external clitoris undisputedly com-
promised sexual enjoyment and a woman’s ability to reach orgasm. Campaigners following 
the pioneering work of Fran Hosken,84 interpreted female circumcision as evidence of global 
domination of women by men.85 As Christine Walley argues, in the process of writing about 
these practices for Western audiences, such cutting frequently became homogenized, divorced 
from its socio-cultural contexts and specificity, and characterized as the ‘tormenting of girls 
… by a monolithic patriarchy’.86
79 N. Tuana, ‘The Speculum of Ignorance: The Women’s Health Movement and Epistemologies of 
Ignorance’ (2006) 21(3) Hypatia 1, 8.
80 In earlier versions of this chapter we identified the speculum clitoris but space prevented us from 
further and finer clitoral differentiations.
81 Tuana, supra n 79, 14. Running a history of the clitoris through the lens of same gender female 
eroticism, prior to the instantiation of homosexuality, and avoiding the models that associate the clitoris 
with the penis, Traub writes: ‘Locating the possibilities of psychic health, wholeness, and agency on the 
clitoris seems a lot to ask of any one organ, particularly if the embodied experience of desire, pleasure 
and orgasm are more fragmented and diffuse than unitary.’ V. Traub, ‘The Psychomorphology of the 
Clitoris’ (1995) 2(1-2) GLQ: A Journal of Lesbian and Gay Studies 81, 100.
82 M. Murphy, Seizing the Means of Reproduction: Entanglements of Feminism, Health and 
Technoscience (Duke University Press 2012).
83 ibid, 86.
84 F.P. Hosken, ‘Female Genital Mutilation in the World Today: A Global Review’ (1981) 11(3) 
International Journal of Health Services 415.
85 K. Bell, ‘Genital cutting and Western discourses on sexuality’ (2005) 19(2) Medical Anthropology 
Quarterly 125.
86 C.J. Walley, ‘Searching for “voices”: Feminism, anthropology, and the global debate over female 
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Recent feminist and anthropological work has raised challenging questions about the way 
in which narratives that deny heterogeneity in practices, experiences and consequences are 
potentially counterproductive and inevitably patronizing.87 Anthropologist and campaigner 
Fuambai Sia Ahmadu, for example, has steadfastly rebutted the claims repeatedly made that 
female circumcision, in her case excision of the external clitoris and inner labia, axiomatically 
and indisputably impacts women’s sexuality and their enjoyment of sex adversely.88 Other 
significant studies have questioned the evidence, now often taken for granted, about the inevi-
tably harmful effects, physical and psychological, of all practices of female genital cutting and 
have insisted on remaining alert to the diversity of practices, experiences and outcomes that 
fall under the expansive rubric of FGM.89
Returning again to our opening concern with the medical—and in particular the anatomical—
clitoris, one of the problems is ‘the representation of the clitoris as a singularly universally 
understood and experienced entity’.90 Feminism’s tendency has been to de-provincialize the 
clitoris: to wrest it from its historical and cultural specificity.91 In response, in the next section 
we consider the circumcised clitoris. Here we draw on ethnography as a domain of knowl-
edge, and recognize how ethnography reveals other (often marginalized or erased) domains of 
knowledge and practice. In this regard we suggest a controversial recuperation of the circum-
cised clitoris as a challenge or counterweight to the drift of de-provincializing in the literature.
5.4 The Circumcised Clitoris
When social anthropologists have paid attention to the clitoris, it has been, for the most part, 
in the context of female circumcision. In attempting to understand the significance of female 
87 J.P. Boddy, Civilizing Women: British Crusades in Colonial Sudan (Princeton University Press 
2007).
88 Ahmadu has spoken publicly and candidly about how the procedures she underwent did not 
diminish her own sexual enjoyment nor prevent her from reaching orgasm. F.S. Ahmadu, ‘Rites and 
Wrongs: An Insider/Outsider Reflects on Power and Excision’ in Shell-Duncan and Hernlund, supra n 
4, 283; F.S. Ahmadu, ‘Between Rites and Rights: Excision in Women’s Experiential Texts and Human 
Contexts’ (2009) 42(2) International Journal of African Historical Studies 283; F.S. Ahmadu, ‘“Ain’t 
I a Woman Too?”: Challenging Myths of Sexual Dysfunction in Circumcised Women’ in Hernlund and 
Shell-Duncan, supra n 27, 278.
89 See for example C. Makhlouf Obermeyer, ‘Female Genital Surgeries: The Known, the Unknown, 
and the Unknowable’ (1999) 13(1) Medical Anthropology Quarterly 79; contributors to Shell-Duncan 
and Hernlund, supra n 4; R.A. Shweder, ‘What about “Female Genital Mutilation”? And Why 
Understanding Culture Matters in the First Place’ (2000) 129(4) Daedalus 209; E. Gruenbaum, The 
Female Circumcision Controversy: an Anthropological Perspective (University of Pennsylvania Press 
2001); Bell, supra n 85;C. Makhlouf Obermeyer, ‘The Health Consequences of Female Circumcision: 
Science, Advocacy, and Standards of Evidence’ (2003) 17(3) Medical Anthropology Quarterly 394. 
Recent studies urge attention to the heightened risks of excision and infibulation as opposed to other 
procedures, for example, while others examine the contours and consequences of campaigns, particu-
larly from western feminist standpoints, to eradicate female circumcision (for example S. Hodžić, The 
Twilight of Cutting: African Activism and Life after NGOs (University of California Press 2016)).
90 J. Rogers, ‘Managing Cultural Diversity in Australia: Legislating Female Circumcision, Legislating 
Communities’ in Hernlund and Shell Duncan, supra n 27; J. Rogers, ‘The First Case Addressing Female 
Genital Mutilation in Australia. Where is the Harm?’ (2016) 41(4) Alternative Law Journal 235.
91 It can be argued for good political reasons, not least feminism’s insistence on the rights of women 
and the challenges it poses to male power and abuse.
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circumcision for those who practice it, the ethnographer, as fieldworker, is compelled to take 
account of wider social and cultural understandings that give it meaning and make it valuable 
or matter-of-fact. It cannot, in other words, be extracted from the social and cultural milieu 
in which it is significant. Corrinne Kratz writes of how Okiek children in Kenya are made 
into adults through complex and orchestrated ceremonies that take place at different times in 
a young person’s life.92 One such ceremony is initiation and for girls usually takes place when 
they are between 14 and 16 years old. There are four stages of initiation stretching over several 
months and include periods of seclusion and instruction. Different ceremonies center on 
different kinds of bodily modification: shaving the head (of both initiates and their mothers), 
piercing and stretching the earlobes and cutting away part of the external clitoris and the inner 
labia. The girl is encouraged to demonstrate bravery and stoicism and her ability to withstand 
fear and pain marks her transition from child to adult. Kratz describes in detail the language 
of speeches, prayers, blessings and songs; the choreography of dances and the configuration 
of dancers; the nature of the gifts, drink and food exchanged. She writes of the involvement 
of kin, villagers, ritual experts and guests in the various ceremonies, as well the places and 
locations in which they take place and details the different roles of male and female kin in 
encouraging and supporting initiates. She describes how the girls are given moral instruction 
and told women’s ‘secrets’ during the periods of seclusion, and of how they change costumes, 
ornaments and headdresses at different stages: the most beautiful and striking being reserved 
for the end of initiation. Kratz also describes the striking effect on initiates and their supporters 
of bodies and faces that are decorated and painted: at different stages, for example, with white 
clay and charcoal, or anointed and glistening with oil. The clitoris appears only fleetingly in 
Kratz’s account. The cutting of it is just one, albeit the most painful, of a series of elaborate 
and orchestrated operations on the body that forge an Okiek woman. While cutting the clitoris 
is clearly an integral part of the initiation ceremonies, it is one part amongst many. We might 
say that in this ethnographic account the clitoris is de-centered: it is not by any means the only 
entity of significance, nor its removal the only significant practice in Okiek initiation ceremo-
nies and rites of puberty.
For Okiek, circumcision creates a permanent physical sign on the body that marks the 
difference not only between an adult and a child, but also between Okiek and other ethnic 
groups who do not mark adulthood by circumcision. There is also something here about the 
visual appearance of the vulva—an aesthetic consideration. Kratz notes how Okiek women 
talk about excision in terms of ‘cleanliness, beauty and adulthood’93 and describe the healed 
vulva as ‘smooth’ and ‘clean’—just as an adult woman’s should be.94 This theme of aesthetics 
and the pleasing appearance of the vulva will, of course, re-emerge when we turn to FGCS, 
but suffice to note here that considerations of beauty, for Okiek women, are intertwined with 
social distinctions of age, gender and ethnicity.
Circumcision in societies that practice it and that value its results is often one practice, 
amongst others, that marks and enacts a person’s moral and social development. Thus, more 
92 C. Kratz, Affecting Performance: Meaning, Movement, and Experience in Okiek Women’s 
Initiation. (Smithsonian Institution Press 1994).
93 ibid, 346.
94 ibid, 114.
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often than not it occurs before or just after puberty.95 This makes Fuambai Sia Ahmadu's 
account of her own journey to be circumcised at the age of 22 all the more striking.96 Ahmadu 
was born in the US, but spent part of her childhood and what she calls her ‘formative years’ 
in Sierra Leone. As an adult, she was invited by her mother and other female elders to be ini-
tiated. She travelled from the US to her ancestral lands in Kono to be circumcised along with 
her younger sister and a young cousin. Ahmadu writes of how, from her own experience, she 
had come to admire the strength and authority of Kono women. She also knew, through experi-
ence, the significance of the influential and all-pervading female ‘secret society’—Bundu—to 
which all initiated women belong. A member of a high ranking Kono family, Ahmadu and her 
family were welcomed with warmth and excitement by both her mother and her father’s kin. 
The initiation ceremonies took place at the homes of her mother’s two sisters and spanned two 
days and a night. They were followed by a period of healing and seclusion (days or weeks, 
she cannot recall). Ahmadu describes the excruciating pain of being cut and the overwhelming 
fear she felt, not least for her younger sister and cousin. Despite the pain and distress that she 
recalls vividly, there is no regret in Ahmadu’s account of her initiation into Bundu. Indeed she 
has taken on the awkward and exceedingly uncomfortable position of championing women 
who have been, or will be, circumcised and of questioning both the motives and the strategies 
of those who are vocal about its eradication.
Ahmadu is keen to convey the fact that women in Kono society are powerful and a force 
to be reckoned with. Bundu, she argues, is one means by which an ideology of transcendent 
female authority is communicated and reproduced. The soko—the ‘mother of the commu-
nity’—is responsible for creating and sanctioning women’s reproductive and productive 
roles, and Bundu forges solidarity amongst women. For Ahmadu, the accusations from 
anti-circumcision perspectives that soko merely collude with patriarchy in the subjugation 
of women is overly simplistic and ethnocentric. She underlines the joy and enthusiasm with 
which Kono women embrace circumcision and concludes that they do it because ‘they want 
to’. In her words: ‘they relish the supernatural powers of their ritual leaders over … men in 
society, and they embrace the legitimacy of female authority and, particularly, the authority of 
their mothers and grandmothers. Also, they maintain their cultural superiority over uninitiated/
uncircumcised women’.97 For Ahmadu, cutting off part of the clitoris marks a woman for life: 
a woman who is not a man, nor a child and, significantly, who is Kono.
Underlining the role of women in both supporting and enacting female circumcision, and 
providing a counter-narrative to those that render women as only passive, subjugated and 
‘done to’, is a necessary and important contribution to the over-heated debates on female 
circumcision.98 However, for our purposes here, it is not enough to say that women ‘want to’ 
be circumcised or that they are in more control and have more authority than is often credited 
them from ‘outsider’ or western perspectives. It behooves us to look more closely at the 
particular cosmologies of the body that make modifications to it not only desirable but also 
imperative. Ahmadu also explains how Kono people are born neither complete, nor unambig-
uously or ‘naturally’ male or female. Bodies need to be worked upon and ambiguous body 
95 E. Gruenbaum, The Female Circumcision Controversy: An Anthropological Perspective 
(University of Pennsylvania Press 2001).
96 Ahmadu 2000, 2007, supra n 88.
97 Ahmadu 2000, supra n 88, 301.
98 And to counter what Githae Mugo calls the ‘external Messiah syndrome’, supra n 20.
126 Research handbook on socio-legal studies of medicine and health
parts removed. In this way, bodies are transformed or completed through social practices that 
make them fully and properly male or female. ‘Women’ and ‘men’ are thus made rather than 
given at birth.99
This idea of working on the body provides a clear link to the cosmetic practices considered 
by the working party and brings us to FGCS. We ask if the preceding brief account of the 
clitoris in medicine, law, feminism and ethnography might contribute to discussion of the 
contemporary popularity of FGCS. We might have headed up this section with reference to the 
commodified clitoris as we are talking about a domain that is highly marketized, with an indus-
try that identifies specific bodily flaws and then provides a solution to rectify them. Instead, 
however, we have settled on the cosmetic clitoris, with a nod to its etymology in the Latinized 
form of the Greek kosmos, meaning order, or orderly arrangement.100
5.5 The Cosmetic Clitoris
The ‘designer vagina’ provides an easy—media-friendly—shorthand for a suite of procedures, 
the most common of which are labiaplasty (also known as labia reduction or vulvaplasty), 
vaginoplasty (vaginal rejuvenation or tightening), pubic mound liposuction and hymenoplasty 
(hymen repair or revirgination).101 Other techniques include hoodectomy (reduction of the clit-
oral hood), G-spot augmentation or enhancement (fillers injected into the G-spot area), and fat 
transfer to the labia majora. These, and other interventions, provide the portfolio of procedure 
that constitute FGCS and it is reported that the market for these is increasing by 10 per cent per 
annum in high income counties.102
For some academics and commentators, the emergence and increasing demand for FGCS is 
tied to the ubiquity of pornography, contemporary sexual culture, neoliberalism, consumerism 
and sexism.103 For others, FGCS is discussed in the context of FGM and the ‘double standard’ 
already noted. In starting our conversation across anthropology and socio-legal studies, we 
also began with this ‘double standard’ and the boundary drawing involved. However, our aim, 
in provincializing the clitoris, is to move beyond the familiar strategy of playing FGCS and 
FGM against each other.104 In turning now to the cosmetic clitoris we draw on the clitorises we 
99 There are other ethnographic examples of how removing all or part of the clitoris resolves gender 
ambiguity by removing what is understood to be male part of the body (for example Gruenbaum, supra 
n 95; M. Strathern ‘Making Incomplete’ in V. Broch-Due, I. Rudie and T. Bleie (eds), Carved Flesh/
CasteSelves: Gendered Symbols and Social Practices (Berg Publishers 1993) 41; A. Talle, ‘Female 
Circumcision in Africa and Beyond: The Anthropology of a Difficult Issue’ in Hernlund and Shell 
Duncan, supra n 27.
100 With thanks to Richard Werbner for emphasising, in a different context, the origins of cosmetics.
101 V. Braun, ‘The women are doing it for themselves’ (2009) 24(60) Australian Feminist Studies 233.
102 R. Simmons, ‘Why more teen girls are getting genital plastic surgery’ Time Magazine (12 May 
2016)
accessed 30 April 2020; J. Stark, ‘Women opt for genital cosmetic surgery’The Age(2 November 
2010)
103 R. Gill and N. Donaghue, ‘As if postfeminism had come true: The turn to agency in cultural 
studies of “sexualisation”’ in S. Madhok, A. Phillips and K. Wilson (eds), Gender, Agency and Coercion 
(Palgrave Macmillan 2013) 240; V. Braun and L. Tiefer, ‘The “designer vagina” and the pathologisation 
of female genital diversity: Interventions for change’ (2010) 8(1) Radical Psychology 1.
104 S. Sheldon and S. Wilkinson, ‘Female Genital Mutilation and Cosmetic Surgery: Regulating 
non-therapeutic body modification’ (1998) 12(4) Bioethics 263; N. Sullivan, ‘“The price we pay for our 
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have identified thus far to address how they provoke a different set of questions which might 
productively redirect the debate.
Much of the debate around FGCS concerns why women might want surgery on their 
genitals, thus the frequent focus on the circulation of pornographic images and the increasing 
visibility of female genitalia that implies.105 However, our consideration of the medical clitoris 
provokes a different question; that is, why medicine might want to surgically alter female 
genitals?
Research on male genital cutting has addressed its persistence across time and cultures, and 
health professionals have been implicated in this since the middle of the nineteenth century.106 
During this period it has been promoted as a cure for everything from masturbation and ‘club 
foot’ to alcoholism, and as a prophylaxis against cancer and each of the major sexually trans-
mitted diseases in turn.107 The medical turn to clitoridectomies took place within this context of 
Victorian anxiety regarding masturbation and morality. Thus, we noted a medical fascination 
with female genitals, and the clitoris in particular as a site of immature or excessive sexuality. 
This provides part of the genealogy of FGCS. However, the Victorian genital cutting of both 
sexes was also part of the ‘professionalization project’ of what was an emerging occupation 
with limited means of justifying state recognition.108 Thus, FGCS can also be contextualized 
within a more prosaic understanding of the history of medicine as a 200 year-old political 
project directed towards securing monopolistic control over the body. FGCS may be no more 
than the actions of a profession seeking to expand the market for its services at a time when 
the vulva has become more visible.
While FGCS as ‘market-capture’ may suggest coordinated action, the history of medicine is 
notable for the role of individual clinicians; be they heroic, maverick, or dangerous. We have 
seen how an earlier history of the medical clitoris was defined, in part, by Isaac Baker Brown. 
With FGCS we can similarly turn to David Matlock—self-styled ‘cosmetic surgeon to the 
stars’.109 Dr Matlock runs the Laser Vaginal Rejuvenation Institute (LVRI) of Los Angeles and 
has been at the forefront of the global emergence of the ‘designer vagina’; including the devel-
opment and patenting of a number of procedures. It was noted earlier that Baker Brown left 
England under a cloud of disapproval that was galvanized more by his discussion of female 
genitals and the impact this might have on the standing of the profession, than the procedures 
he performed. In the US the Committee on Gynecologic Practice of the American College 
of Obstetricians and Gynecologists has issued a clear statement of opinion regarding FGCS. 
While the statement stresses the lack of clinical evidence underpinning the development and 
provision of the procedures, they also allude to, but do not name, Dr Matlock. Somewhat rem-
iniscent of London’s Victorian Royal Colleges, the Committee raised ethical concerns for the 
marketing and franchising of an ‘unproven surgical procedure with obvious risks’, pointing to 
common good?”’: Genital Modification and the Somatechnologies of Cultural (In)Difference’ (2007) 
17(3) Social Semiotics 395.
105 Braun and Tiefer, supra n 103.
106  R. Darby, A Surgical Temptation: The Demonization of the Foreskin and the Rise of Circumcision 
in Britain (Chicago University Press 2005); G.P. Miller, ‘Circumcision: Cultural-legal Analysis’ (2002) 
9 Virginia Journal of Social Policy and the Law 497.
107 ibid.
108 M. Thomson, Endowed: Regulating the Male Sexed Body (Routledge 2007).
109 D. Matlock, ‘Cosmetic Surgeon to the Stars’ (drmatlock.com) <http:// www .drmatlock .com/ > 
accessed 2 April 2018.
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‘a business model that controls the dissemination of scientific knowledge’.110 As with Baker 
Brown, the question appears to be how Matlock publicly conducts himself rather than the 
legitimacy of the procedures and his clinical practice.
Finally, reference to FGCS, like reference to FGM, obscures a diversity of practices, mean-
ings and motivations. In paying attention to the circumcised clitoris, we addressed the heteroge-
neity of practices, consequences and meanings attached to FGM, and to how the differences get 
erased in campaigns to eradicate it. Ruth Holliday has recently turned her attention to what gets 
included under the rubric ‘designer vagina’. Her work complicates assumptions often made:
Designer vaginas are most often associated in both feminist literature and media panics with young 
women having labiaplasties but the majority of women undergoing vaginoplasty—‘tightening’ 
surgeries also associated with the designer vagina—are older, post-childbirth, women. Furthermore, 
whilst vaginoplasty is a relatively recent named procedure, it has been practiced for many years as 
repair to prolapse.111
With 50 per cent of women experiencing prolapse at some point after childbirth, Holliday asks 
if it is possible to separate out ‘repair to prolapse’, ‘vaginal rejuvenation’ and the ‘designer 
vagina’. Staying with our focus on medicine as a commercial practice, FGCS may therefore 
represent, in part, a rebranding of what is a therapeutic procedure often unavailable in public 
health systems.112
In considering the legal clitoris we noted how, in Pemberton-Billing, law echoed early 
medical understandings of the clitoris. While no doubt an extraordinary case, this nevertheless 
illustrated our interest in how certain understandings of the clitoris have more traction than 
others, and with the alliance between law and medicine. Looking at FGCS in the UK, we 
note that the medico-legal alliance continues to shape regulatory responses. While there has 
been pressure placed on government to bring FGCS within the ambit of the Female Genital 
Mutilation Act 2003, this has been resisted with the support of the professional bodies. Thus, 
in terms of contemporary practice where much regulation is provided by professional bodies, 
an alliance emerges that protects medical autonomy and decision-making. The judgment of 
individual practitioners trumps legal control. Of particular note in this regard is the work of 
the Parliamentary Home Affairs Select Committee. The Committee recommended that the 
Female Genital Mutilation Act 2003 be amended to make FGCS a criminal offence.113 The 
110 ‘Vaginal “rejuvenation” and cosmetic vaginal procedures’ (2007) 110 ACOG Committee Opinion 
No. 378. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists. Obstet Gynecol 737–8 <https:// 
www .acog .org/ clinical/ clinical -guidance/ committee -opinion/ articles/ 2020/ 01/ elective -female -genital 
-cosmetic -surgery> accessed 6 April 2018.
111 R. Holliday, ‘Vagina dialogues: theorizing the “designer vagina”’ in G. Griffin and M. Jordal 
(eds), Body, Migration, Re/constructive Surgeries: Making the Gendered Body in a Globalized World, 
(Routledge 2019) 192–208 at 198.
112 Holliday draws on her earlier research on cosmetic surgery tourism to note that working class 
women discussed their procedures in terms of ‘enhancement’ whereas middle-class women were more 
likely to identify their surgery as correction as repair. For her, ‘The difference between repair to prolapse 
and the “designer vagina” may thus be a difference only of classed terms’, supra n 11, 199. Holliday’s 
example urges attention to the way in which FGCS is legitimated through biomedicine and to how the 
meanings attached to it, as well as how it is evaluated, are contingent on the classed bodies that undergo 
FGCS. It returns us also to colonial politics of knowledge that we mentioned earlier.
113 House of Commons Home Affairs Committee ‘Female genital mutilation: follow-up—Sixteenth 
Report of Session 2014–15’ (Houses of Commons, 10 March 2015) 6.
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government has not acted and medical professional bodies have also rejected the suggestion 
of a ban.114 The Royal College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists, for instance, stated that 
the case for an outright ban was ‘weak’, and this was rejected in favor of maintaining clinical 
freedom.115 Similarly, the Royal College of Surgeons acknowledged the legal ambiguity but 
merely recommended that practitioners should ‘consult The Royal College of Obstetricians 
and Gynaecologists (RCOG) web site before considering performing FGCS’.116 Our analysis 
should not be read as a call for the criminalization of FGCS. Rather, we draw on our consid-
eration of the legal clitoris to foreground the role of the medico-legal alliance—an alliance 
that continues to contribute to regulatory incoherence. Here medical autonomy and the 
medico-legal alliance trumps feminist voices either lobbying for FGCS to be brought within 
the FGM legislation, or feminist and anthropological approaches that draw attention to age 
and adulthood; that is, that focus on the discrepancy between laws that forbid FGM at any age 
(including competent adults), and a situation where FGCS appears to be permitted at any age 
(including for young people under the age of consent).
Our consideration of the liberated clitoris engaged the work of the women’s health move-
ment and active campaigns against FGM. These political movements mobilized the clitoris 
to liberate women from oppressive medical and customary practices. Looking at FGCS in 
the context of the liberated clitoris raises important but difficult questions. Michelle Murphy 
argues that vaginal self-examination was an integral part of the processes of responsibilization 
that have shaped contemporary health care: ‘A new moral economy of healthcare arose—
calling for the well-educated, well informed, self-knowing patient to be prepared to advocate 
for herself as a consumer within corporate medical institutions’.117 Holliday links this same 
responsibilized consumer to the emergence of the ‘designer vagina’. Thus, there is something 
of a paradox: a feminist epistemological practice becomes linked to FGCS—a suite of prac-
tices seen to embody postfeminism and the gains of neoliberalism.118
Turning finally to what we have dubbed the circumcised clitoris we draw again on the writing 
of Ahmadu. For her, the visible outcome of her excised vulva is aesthetically pleasing.119 We 
know that many other circumcised women consider uncut/uncircumcised genitals ugly.120 We 
also know from other ethnographic examples that female circumcision may underline a dis-
tinction between male and female bodies and their capacities, or between ethnic or classed 
sense of self and belonging; it can be one amongst a number of procedures and practices over 
the life-course that forges the adult woman, or renders the female body marriageable or fertile. 
We know little, however, ethnographically, about the meanings attached to FGCS, not only for 
114 Royal College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists, ‘Ethical Opinion Paper—Ethical considera-
tions in relation to female genital cosmetic surgery (FGCS)’ 6.
115 ibid.
116 Royal College of Surgeons ‘Is female genital cosmetic surgery (FGCS) covered?’ (RCSeng, 2016) 
<https:// www .rcseng .ac .uk/ surgeons/ surgical -standards/ working -practices/ cosmetic -surgery/ surgeons 
-faq #femalesurg> accessed 16 November 2018.
117 M. Murphy ‘Immodest Witnessing, Affective Economies, and Objectivity’ in C. Cipolla, K. 
Gupta, D.A. Rubin and A. Willey (eds), Queer Feminist Science Studies (University of Washington Pres, 
2017) 189.
118 Holliday, supra n 113.
119 Ahmadu quoted in C.D. Londoño Sulkin, ‘Fuambai’s strength’ (2016) 6(8) HAU: Journal of 
Ethnographic Theory 107.
120 J. Boddy, ‘Gender Crusades: The female circumcision controversy in in cultural perspective’ in 
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the women who undergo the procedures that come under its remit, but also for their peers or for 
the social groups for which FGCS is one amongst other forms of body modification that are not 
only desirable or aspirational, but also life-enhancing. We are told that ‘designer vaginas’ are 
increasing in popularity and include procedures that trim and make symmetrical inner labia; 
unhood the clitoris; smooth out or augment the mons pubis or outer labia. Bikini waxes and the 
removal of pubic hair are also a means of beautifying vulvas, as are piercings and bejeweling 
(‘vajazzling’). Advertisements sell procedures to re-position the clitoris or to remove ‘excess’ 
tissue from around it and cosmetic surgeons promote their services in feminist idioms: such 
as helping women, for example, to achieve their full sexual potential—‘because you’re worth 
it’.121 But there are few ethnographic studies that locate FGCS in the social and cultural worlds 
of those for whom it is meaningful and who approach it matter-of-factly.
As already noted, in the UK the most common FGCS procedures are labiaplasty, vagino-
plasty and hymen repair. While operations to trim inner labia seem to be more common than 
cutting the clitoris—a common logic prevails: the logic of containment, neatness and tidiness. 
Clitoral hood reduction is described on the American Society of Plastic Surgeons website as 
a procedure that can be performed alongside labiaplasty in order to balance the genitals. In 
other words if you reduce the size of the labia the clitoris might appear ‘top heavy’ if not also 
reduced. Thus, a clitoral hood reduction ‘can lend balance’.122 Here, then, we have beautiful 
female genitals as ‘balanced’, symmetrical and neat. Dr Alter, who offers clitoropexy (clitoral 
hood reduction), informs potential customers viewing his website: ‘[clitoropexy] repositions 
the protruding clitoris and reduces the length and projection of the clitoral hood. It is … indi-
cated in the woman with mild clitoral enlargement who does not want to undergo a formal 
clitoris reduction’. He points out that:
Some women are bothered by the size of the clitoral hood and the clitoris shaft or head (glans). The 
hood may protrude too much causing the woman to be self-conscious or irritated. She may feel that 
the protruding hood and clitoris cause a bulge in her clothing or the appearance of a small penis.
Thus, here also the removal of ambiguity and the re-assertion of a marker of distinction 
between female and male bodies.
In identifying the cosmetic clitoris our aim is also to locate FGCS in a wider range of 
aesthetic practices. Thus, we end with the pierced clitoris, of interest for a number of reasons. 
First, it is a legally ambiguous object. Piercing the clitoris may constitute an offence under 
the Female Genital Mutilation Act 2003. It falls within Type IV of the typology set out by the 
World Health Organization.123 Second, clitoral piercing is a form of cosmetic work that may 
well be more popular than FGCS. Third, the pierced clitoris directs us away from socio-legal 
studies and back to ethnography.
Both the hood or glans of the clitoris can be pierced, and each allow for the insertion of 
ornaments or jewelry. As James Myers remarks for devotees of genital piercing in the US: 
‘A growing number of people … believe that the penis and the clitoris are just as deserving 
121 Holliday, supra n 112, 205.
122 ‘Vaginal Rejuvenation’ (American Society of Plastic Surgeons, 2018) <https:// www .plasticsurgery 
.org/ cosmetic -procedures/ vaginal -rejuvenation/ clitoral -hood -reduction> accessed 6 April 2018.
123 WHO Reference. The use of this typology in English and Welsh courts was encouraged by Sir 
James Munby in Re B and G (children) (care proceedings) [2015] EWFC 3, 69.
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of gilding as are earlobes’.124 As he also notes, there appears to be much less ethnographic 
research on all forms of body modification in the global north compared to practices in ‘tradi-
tional’ societies of the global south.125 His study of ‘nonmainstream body modification’ reveals 
an emphasis on sexual enhancement and self-expression, and a celebration and expectation of 
pain.126 He writes about how intimate piercings can signify trust and love between sexual 
partners and affiliation amongst devotees. And, as in other ‘extreme’ body modifications,127 
they mark on the body an antipathy towards the ‘mainstream’ and render visible the category 
of person to which one belongs. Moreover, genital piercings and the decorations they allow 
enhance the body and are considered to be aesthetically pleasing: to be, in a word, beautiful.
6. CONCLUSION
We have argued that the clitoris should be provincialized. Our intention has been to place 
the liberated clitoris, in which both female sexuality and female identity are located, in its 
historical and cultural place and in doing so to de-universalize and thus provincialize it. 
Concomitantly, by removing the circumcised clitoris from the ‘savage’ slot, in which it is 
imagined as an entity of only the uncivilized or barbaric ‘other’, our intention has been to 
de-provincialize it: to show some of the features it shares with the cosmetic clitoris. By putting 
the cosmetic clitoris in the same frame as the circumcised clitoris we see both different and 
similar logics at play. The contained, balanced, neat and tidy vulva that is aesthetically pleas-
ing; the removal of gendered ambiguity—the insistence on a clitoris that cannot be mistaken 
for a penis; the liberatory potential of knowing or cutting the clitoris, and so forth. Our aim 
has been to contribute to debates that are unsettling the common but glib notions that ‘they’ 
are mired in tradition, culture even, that ‘we’ have moved past; to interrogate the boundaries 
shored up between the rational and culture-free zones of the ‘west’ and the traditional and 
overly-cultural ‘rest’; and to analyse the clitoris as mutable, accruing alternative (but always 
relevant) meanings in different contexts. By putting them in the same frame, also brings into 
relief ways in which the cosmetic clitoris is highly commodified, marketized and shaped by 
a relatively aggressive industry adept at manufacturing desire.
By looking at the clitoris in 'medicine, law and society' and by including both feminist and 
anthropological perspectives we have responded to the aims of this collection and hope to have 
illustrated the fruitfulness of putting anthropology and socio-legal studies into conversation. 
Focusing on the clitoris and important contemporary debates, we make a more general argu-
ment about wresting understandings of the body and health from the sole preserve of biomed-
icine and the life sciences. This means moving the object of study away from only those who 
have often assumed, and been granted, the privilege to define.
124 J. Myers, ‘Nonmainstream body modification: genital piercing, branding, burning, and cutting’ 
(1992) 21(3) Journal of Contemporary Ethnography 267, 299.
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127 Myers includes genital piercing, branding and cutting as ‘nonmainstream body modifications’.
